The 215-page book has ten well-researched and academic chapters. The book is an outcome of several discussions and meetings among Muslim women's groups from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The writers include Norani Othman, Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Fatma Khafagy, Kamala Chandrakirana, Yuniyanti Chuzaifah, Zainah Anwar, the late Zaitun Mohamad Kasim, Suzaina Kadir, Norma A. Maruhom, Fatima Pir T. Allian, and many more well-known women activists and academicians, who have persistently championed the rights of Muslim women for more than a decade. The works of these women need to be recognised, shared and made accessible to all.This is the article from Indonesia (draft before published, not for quotation)
THE BATTLE OVER A ‘NEW’ INDONESIA:
Religious Extremism, Democratization and
Women’s Agency in a Plural Society
By: Kamala Chandrakirana & Yuniyanti Chuzaifah
Introduction – Religious Extremism in a Time of Political Transition
Part 1 – Religious Extremism in Indonesia
A History of Political Islam
The Multiple Faces of Religious Extremism
Implications on Indonesia’s Socio-Political Life
Part 2 – Gendered Implications and Women’s Agency
Women’s Place in Indonesian Society
The Challenge of Religious Extremism to Women
Gendered Arenas of Struggle
Women’s Agency in the Islamic Discourse on Justice
Part 3 – Islam and Reclaiming Space for Democracy and Justice in Indonesia
Sources of Resistance to Religious Extremism
Strategies for Reclaiming Space for Democracy and Justice
Limitations and Challenges
INTRODUCTION – RELIGIOUS EXTERMISM IN A TIME OF POLITICAL TRANSITION
Currently, almost 190 million Muslims live in Indonesia. They constitute 85% of this country’s total population, and 20% of all Muslims worldwide. Demographically, Indonesia is the fourth most populated country after China, India and the United States, with 220 million people inhabiting an archipelago of 13,000 islands. It is also the largest nation of Muslims in the world. However, despite the predominance of one single religion, Indonesia is essentially a multicultural society. Spread throughout the archipelago are more than 200 ethnic groups speaking distinct local languages. The western part of the archipelago are inhabited by communities of Malay origin, while the main eastern-most island is populated by peoples of the Austronesian race. Interspersed among them all are the Chinese who have become an integral part of this cultural mix after several waves of in-migration from mainland China throughout the pre-colonial and colonial eras. Among the 30 million Indonesians who are not Muslim, Christianity (Protestant and Catholicism), Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism as well as various local indigenous religions are commonly practiced. The Indonesian nation was built on the premise of its diversity, as articulated in its national motto: ‘unity in diversity’.
The first time the Indonesian public realized that the nation was facing a new form of religious extremism was not when Islamist radicals bombed a nightclub in Bali, in 2002, killing more than 180 people, most of whom were Western tourists. This particular incident is significant in a different way, namely that it instigated the US and its allies to put Indonesia in the global map of the ‘war against terrorism’. But the first shock over religious extremism for Indonesians occurred several years earlier, in 1999, when an island in the northeast tip of the archipelago, known for its quaint history as ‘the spice islands’ and seen as Indonesia’s model of multicultural peaceful co-existence, broke into three years of brutal war between its Christian and Muslim populations. During this violent communal conflict in Maluku, jihad fighters were openly recruiting in towns across Java and publicly seeking donations to support the ‘jihad war’ from drivers caught in the middle of Jakarta’s traffic jams. In this period of time, the public face of Indonesia experienced a visible transformation: more and more men grew long beards and dressed in long robes, more women chose to cover themselves from head to toe, and messages about an Islam under siege were broadcasted all around town through banners along the streets, through cheap publications sold by street vendors, and through loud microphones from the mosques during the Friday prayers.
In 1999, when the war in Maluku first broke out, Indonesia was actually a few months away from commemorating the first anniversary of President Soeharto’s unexpected resignation. It was an historic event as he was the primary architect of a very powerful, corrupt and abusive New Order regime, who ruled with an iron hand for more than three decades. This resignation opened the door to a period commonly-referred to as ‘the reformation era’ in which a ‘new’ democratic Indonesia would be built. A flood of bold campaigns and initiatives were commenced to address past human rights abuses, state-sponsored racism against the Chinese, discrimination and violence against women, systematic corruption, destruction of natural resources, structural poverty, and other issues of perceived urgency by a restless community of activists. However, not one year into these ambitious endeavors, the Maluku conflict signaled to the ‘reformers’ that, before proceeding on with their campaigns, they must first face the fact that the nation was disintegrating. The Indonesia that had just survived Soeharto’s New Order regime was torn apart by communal violence and betrayed by the impotence of its law enforcers and political leaders. Within the next four years, violent conflicts break out in at least four other parts of the country. The vision of a ‘new’ democratic Indonesia just around the corner, as it were, was circumvented by the dramatic spread of extremist views and aspirations – ideas which found fertile ground in a society still pained and bitter after years of injustice under the New Order.
So, the rise and force of religious extremism that we see today in Indonesia cannot be divorced from the internal dynamics of a society going through a violent and chaotic transition nor from the lingering grip of the authoritarian regime which came before that. But, it should be noted, it is also a product of a global phenomenon, with origins outside (and independent) of Indonesia per se. The post-Cold War world where there remains only one global superpower – the United States – has generated heightened critique and opposition to it and its Western allies, including among post-colonial societies in the Muslim world. From among them, a small minority of radicals – who gained strength and resources through US support in the first place – have taken up terrorist means to express their opposition. A powerful global war has been declared on them, with repercussions which go beyond the acts of terrorism itself, promoting a militaristic approach to deep social problems and strengthening the institutions of control and military power which go with it.
The interlinking of specific local and global dynamics have produced the kind of religious extremism we now see in Indonesia. The solution, in turn, must come out of strategies which are both local as well as global in nature.
This paper will describe the face of religious extremism in Indonesia, explain its implications to women and women’s agency, and explore the various forces and strategies which are in place to reclaim the space for democracy, social justice and peaceful co-existence in the ‘new’ Indonesia. This paper is written based on discussions among young Islamic intellectuals and women’s rights activists , as well as on interviews with Islamist radical groups and individuals .
PART 1 – RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM IN INDONESIA
Before focusing on the issue of religious extremism in Indonesia, it would be prudent to begin with an historical starting point.
A History of Political Islam
Islam entered the archipelago in the 13th century through Muslim traders from Gujarat, India. They arrived to a society where Hinduism, Buddhism and various forms of animism were widely practiced. The conversion process occurred gradually, through a predominantly cultural approach. Muslim preachers used local popular art, such as the shadow puppets and traditional music, as a means to convey their teachings. As local kings converted, so did their populations. Conversions also occurred as part of a growing community of indigenous Muslim traders.
As with the diverse ethnic and racial identities of the Indonesian population, Islam in Indonesia also has a pluralistic character. The main communities include ‘traditionalist’, ‘modernist’, ‘syncretic’ and ‘fundamentalist’ Muslims. While they represent different Islamic ways of life, to a large degree, these are also the categories on which Islam-based social, and political, organizing have occurred. The traditionalist Muslims have deep rural roots, practicing a ‘homegrown’ Islam through a widespread system of religious boarding schools, called pesantren, for young girls and boys. In 1926, the traditionalists established themselves into a mass social organization, named Nahdatul Ulama. Currently, it has a membership of 37 million people. The syncretic Muslims, often called abangan, practice a mix of Islamic and pre-Islamic rituals and beliefs. They are not organized in the same way as other ‘streams’ of Muslim communities, constituting more of a religious-cultural community than a social organization. They are large in numbers, though difficult to know exactly how large because of their lack of formal organization. The modernists are urban-based intellectuals concerned about ‘purifying’ Islam from traditional and syncretic practices. They organized themselves in 1912 into a mass social organization, named Muhammadiyah, and set up institutions of Islamic higher education throughout the country. Currently, their membership reach 25 million people. The last category, the fundamentalist Muslims, are the smallest of all the four categories of Muslim communities in Indonesia and take the ‘textualist’ approach to Islam.
Ever since the nationalist movement against Dutch colonial rule, Islam has always been an integral part of political life among Indonesians. There are several points in Indonesia’s history which signify this fact. The first modern political organization set up for the purpose of challenging colonial power was an Islamic organization of traders, called Sarekat Islam. Then, immediately after national independence was achieved, the most contentious issue among the newly-liberated Indonesians had to do with the specific mention of Islam in the state ideology, as opposed to a generic mention of ‘belief in God’. The final choice of the latter was only reached after a long heated political debate where the fundamentalists and Islamists had to accept the majority preference for a secular state, as opposed to an Islamic one. Soekarno, Indonesia’s first president, maintained his power through a balancing of three major political forces of that time, namely the communist party, the military and Islam.
During the first half of Soeharto’s 32-year dictatorship, Islam was instrumentally used as a means of political control as well as a means of promoting social agendas (e.g., by obtaining support from the ulama for birth control). The New Order regime exercised an overall strategy of depoliticizing the population, which also meant explicit measures to depoliticize Islam. During the last years of power, Soeharto made heightened efforts to gain support and more effectively coopt the community of Islamic intelligensia. He masterminded the establishment of an organization of Muslim scholars, ICMI, which became the means for many Muslim intellectuals to enter the state bureaucracy and penetrate into the halls of state power. Meanwhile, small radical Islamist groups which fought for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia (e.g, Darul Islam, Komando Jihad, NII/TII) were consistently demonized and criminalized. In order to flee from imprisonment, several key leaders lived in exile outside the country (many in Malaysia) and eventually linked up with radical groups in the Middle East. They returned to Indonesia immediately after Soeharto’s resignation from power and played a key role in building the Islamist groups in Indonesia today.
Given this track record, it should not come as a surprise that, during this critical turning point in Indonesia’s social political history, when Indonesians are seeking to redefine itself after the end of the New Order, that Islam returns again to center stage.
The Multiple Faces of Religious Extremism
There is a range of Islamist groups in Indonesia today, each with distinct relations to the state.
At one end of the spectrum are violent radical groups with names such as the ‘Front for the Defenders of Islam’ (Front Pembela Islam) and ‘Jihad Warriors’ (Laskar Jihad). They were established within the first year after Soeharto’s resignation and have carried out violent attacks on bars and nightclubs in Jakarta and other cities in Java. When the war broke out in Maluku, Laskar Jihad recruited, trained and sent people there to fight ‘the religious war’ against Christians. In their ranks are found street thugs and former members para-military defense units established by the military as a form of ‘community-based’ security force. Many believe that military and political elites played a role in the establishment, training and later growth of these types of groups, with the purpose of creating political chaos. These groups do not espouse any specific political vision, Islamist or not. Analysts have referred to their version of activism as ‘street politics’. Their struggle has never been defined in opposition to the state per se.
There are also fundamentalist or Islamist groups which espouse an explicitly Islamic political ideology. One of the most prominent groups in this case is the post-New Order political party called the ‘Justice Party’ (Partai Keadilan). As an officially registered political party, it still operates within the confines of the existing political system. Most of its leaders had been raised in the Islamic students’ movement and its ideology mirrors that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It combines the struggle for democratization and the overthrow of the old power structure with explicit ideas on Islamic economics and Islamization of the polity. It is mostly seen as one of the most effectively organized among the new political parties in Indonesia today. Their following is diverse, spread among academics, military and the average lay person, and it is growing in number. Their promise is peace and justice, which are desperately-felt aspirations for many Indonesians, through the Islamization of the nation-state. Many observers acknowledge this party’s capacity to develop into a serious political force in the future of Indonesian politics.
At the other end of the spectrum are Islamist groups which believe in a pan-Islamic political entity beyond the Indonesian nation-state. They are groups like Majelis Mujahidin, Hizbut Tahrir and the Jemaah Islamiyah that has been put in the list of international terrorists by the US and the United Nations. Majelis Mujahaddin has links to the much older movement of Darul Islam which had similar goals and went underground throughout the New Order regime. It is actively lobbying Muslim parliamentarians to revive the debate on putting Islam and the Shariah Law explicitly in the normative foundations of the country, including in the amendments of the constitution. These groups position themselves as presenting an alternative to Western capitalism and aspire to create an alternative Islamist economic regime.
According to a report by the International Crisis Group , based in Belgium, the Jemaah Islamiyah grew out of Darul Islam leaders living in exile who made links with radical groups in Afganistan and took part in the training camps which taught them how to make bombs and other forms of attacks of mass destruction. After their training camp was closed down in Afganistan, they set up another one in Mindanao, Philippines, to train recruits from Southeast Asia. The alumni of these training camps return to their respective countries and maintain a clear chain of command which covers the whole region of Southeast Asia. Based on police interrogations of captured terrorists from the Bali bombing and other related bombing campaigns, Indonesians have a key role at the leadership levels of this regional command structure. They are financed through small economic activities, membership dues and criminal acts, as well as through occassional funding from Middle Eastern sources, particularly from Saudi Arabia.
It is difficult to put numbers to these divergent Islamist groups. Relative to the traditionalist, modernist and syncretic Muslims in Indonesia, it can safely be said that their numbers are small. In the latest general elections of 1999, radical Islamist politial parties received only 1.5% of the people’s vote. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, their following has been growing at a rate that is alarming. This is a result of intense organizing and recruitment by a relatively small but effective network. The Islamist groups are also very vocal and visible, with help from national and international media looking for signs of ‘terrorism’ and dramatic news. This means, consequently, that they are more present in the public consciousness than the proponents of mainstream Islam.
Implications on Indonesian Socio-Political Life
The significance of Islamist groups in Indonesia lies not in their numbers, but rather in the institutions and consituencies in which they flourish and on which they impact. Two critical institutions for civil society empowerment – education and local community gatherings – are arenas where extremist visions and values are having wide and almost unobstructed influence. A third critical institution that is detrimental to Indonesia’s democratic agenda has actually benefitted from the rise of religious extremism. This is the military, which made a definitive comeback, having found new grounds to legitimate its strong presence in the political landscape, particularly with support from the global proponents of the ‘war against terrorism’.
Among the most ambitious and effective recruiting by conservative and Islamist groups is happening in mainstream institutions of education. On-campus organizing is occurring in the natural sciences departments of many major national universities in Indonesia. Recruiters form groups, which function as ‘families’ that provide a wide range of support for its members, from the mundane needs of daily life as a student to the spiritual quests of a youthful soul. Smaller ‘family’ units combine to make larger entities where analysis of socio-political issues of the day are made using conservative and Islamist perspectives and views. In middle schools, student committees (commonly know as ‘OSIS’) have become a means to pressure school administrators to allow for more Islam-based extra-curricular activities where conservative views are expressed and eventually practiced.
Even though the majority of pesantren, the Muslim boarding schools, convey the conventional traditionalists teachings of Islam and teach liberal values and pluralism, a few have become the organizing centers of Islamist radicals. These are pesantren with strong direct links to the Middle East, of which the most prominent is the pesantren Ngruki in Solo, Central Java, where the alleged head of Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, is based. These mainstream institutions of education have, in the past, been arenas in which moderate Islamic views and values about multiculturalism and tolerance were promoted. If the penetration of conservative and Islamist views into these institutions are not addressed, it will certainly make a big impact not only on the future generation of Indonesians, but also on the more immediate (extremist) nature of civil society aspirations.
Another crucial institution which is directly linked to the formation of Indonesian civil society is local community gatherings, such as community prayer groups and local mosques (sometimes referred to as halaqah). Aside from functioning as a place to pray collectively, these institutions are essentially informal centers for communities to address their common problems and needs. Many women’s prayer groups, or pengajian, also function as a savings group, a peer support group and, at times, a base from which women express and advocate their interests to the larger community. Local mosques are not just places for prayers, but are also the site where local sports clubs for the youth are formed, where announcements from the village head are given, and where controversial issues faced by communities are discussed. The spread of conservative and Islamist views in these institutions mean that the framework for communities to address their own problems and needs are more and more defined in conservative or radical religious terms. Given the centrality of community empowerment in the furthering of the democratization process, this development will, again, have important consequences to the nature of civil society aspirations at its most grassroots level.
The powerful ‘war agaisnt terrorism’ has benefitted the Indonesian military in a substantial way. In the aftermath of Soeharto’s resignation, the military was an institution under severe scrutiny because of its record of human rights abuses and its dominant role in the political and economic institutions of the country. One of the explicit priority agendas of the ‘reformation era’ was to end the political role of the military and demand public accountability for its abuse of civilian populations. When Islamist radicalism in Indonesia was framed exclusively in terms of ‘international terrorism’, after the Bali bombing, then it became imperative for the global proponents of the ‘war against terrorism’ to actively support the empowerment of the Indonesian military. The anti terrorism bill being discussed in the legislature has brought back special powers of the state and the military which resembles more the authoritarian system of the New Order regime. A clear mark of the rebound of military power in Indonesian politics is the government-sanctioned military campaign in Aceh in 2003, carried out in the footsteps of the US attack on Iraq. The militaristic approach to dealing with social and political issues is back, significantly reducing the space for democratization.
Some of the main constituencies among which conservative and radical Islamist views are gaining support demonstrate the structural roots of Indonesia’s vulnerability to extremism. Three main constituencies are worth mentioning in this respect: a frustrated labor force, a disillusioned middle class, and the restless youth. The mismanagement of the economy which have gone uncorrected over the years, combined with the rising economic disparaties since the big economic crisis of 1998, have caused many people in the labor force to lose their jobs and pushed many to seek employment abroad, including to the Middle East. The educated middle class are also having more difficulies in finding appropriate employment and many are losing faith in the political leadership of the country. The younger generation who are currently in school know that they face an uncertain future while the nation continues to fall apart, economically and politically. It is the structural nature of poverty and inequality as well as the systematic pattern of bad governance which makes radical groups appealing. As the modern secular state has disappointed them, another option is being presented in its place: government by religion.
Ultimately, the danger of current trends of religious extremism in Indonesia is not an overnight transformation of the secular state into an Islamic state, nor is it the risk of causing large deaths of innocent people (more deaths have been caused by communal conflict and state/military violence). The danger lies more in:
(i) the threat it poses to Indonesia’s democratization agenda (especially if the means to ‘defeat’ religious radicals violates the very democratic principles it was meant to defend), and in
(ii) the narrowing space for multiculturalism and tolerance in this plural society.
The latter is demonstrated in the apparent shift towards conservative and exclusivist attitudes and behaviors in mainstream communities, including among the middle class and the traditionally moderate Muslims. Children enrolled in Muslim schools, for example, are being taught to decline from joining their neighbors in celebrating Christmas, as this is seen as a betrayal to the Muslim faith.
A real challenge emerges in the sense that the very process of democratization itself becomes a venue by which radical Islamist aspirations disseminate and take root. Two key elements in Indonesia’s democratization process are: regional autonomy and a free press. Under the auspices of regional autonomy, local governments are actively considering to adopt the Shariah Law into state law. This is occurring in regions where Islamist movements have historically been strong, such as in West Java and South Sulawesi. In Aceh, the national legislature agreed to the offical adoption of the Shariah Law by the regional government as part of a political appeasement to this rebel province.
The liberalization of the press has been an important achievement of the post-Soeharto democratization agenda. The lifting of censorship on publications have been a crucial part of this. Such open and free press has been ambitiously and effectively utilized by radical Islamist groups to convey their message and appeal to the general public. The mainstream press industry has also benefitted from this significant opening, as television, print, radio and internet media companies mushroom and grow. This expansive growth has not been accompanied by rigorous coverage of crucial issues of the day, however. Governed by its search for profit, mainstream media has chosen the easy path and remained uncritical in its reportage on the different voices of Islam. Its own fanaticism regarding dramatic headline stories has meant that the voices of moderation finds too little space in the mainstream media.
PART 2 – GENDERED IMPLICATIONS OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND WOMEN’S AGENCY
What do all these developments mean for women in Indonesia today? Again, we establish first our starting point, which raises the dimension of culture and social structure, in order to understand the place of women in Indonesian society prior to entering the particular discussion on religious extremism.
Women’s Place in Indonesian Society
Following the plural nature of Indonesian society, women’s position in the community is also diverse and, therefore, the ways in which unequal gendered relations are articulated is also distinct from one community to another. In West Sumatera, for example, the society is traditionally organized along matrilineal lines. This does not mean that women are the primary decision makers in the allocation of community resources, but it does mean that resources flow through their lineage which, potentially at least, would influence her bargaining position in the affairs of the family. Most of the rest of Indonesian society is organized along partilineal lines and have unequal access to family wealth and inheritance.
Despite such diversity, however, there are some commonalities across the board regarding women’s role in Indonesian society. No where in Indonesia is the mandatory confinement of women inside the house practiced. All over the country, women have been key players in the markets, as small traders of food, cloth and other daily goods. They also have specific roles in the agricultural process in a country where farming is the dominant mode of livelihood. Along with the industrialization process, women entered the factories as the source of cheap and skilled labor. Many of the industries which flourish in the Indonesian economy recently, such as the garment and shoe industries, have prefered to employ women than men, although the average wage of women is generally lower than men’s. In many households in Java, more and more women have become the primary breadwinner for her family. If they do not find factory jobs in Java, they will seek employment as domestic servants in the Middle East and wealthier Asian countries, such as Hongkong, Singapore and Malaysia, to brinf foreign currency earnings for the family. Within the middle class, Indonesian women have a prominent place in higher education, both in terms of numbers as well as performance.
Indonesian women have also had active organizational lives, both in secular as well as religious-based institutions. Within Nahdatul Ulamai, the traditionalist Muslim organization, and Muhammadiyah, the modernist Muslim organization, special women’s bodies have been established. These bodies have relative autonomy in their operations, though their activities remain within the broader framework defined by their respective male-dominated parent organizations. Major social movements within Indonesian history have benefitted from a strong presence of women, this is the case in terms of the nationalist movement of the 1930s to 1940s, the socialist and communist movements in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as in the social justice movement during the recent New Order regime.
As for the state, the modern Indonesian state has provided some basic protections for women, but not enough. The constitution states the equality of women and men. The marriage law of 1974 sets a minimum marriage age for women, provide women with the right to initiate divorce, and protect women’s equal access to inheritance. The international convention against discrimination of women, CEDAW, was ratified by the Indonesian government as early as 1984. Valueable as these basic protections are, there are wide arenas of women’s lives in which protection is either absent or being systematically violated by the state. These are the areas in which the women’s movement have claimed its space in the broader struggles for democratization and justice in Indonesia.
Some of the major objections raised by women activists against Soeharto’s New Order regime involve the narrow and disempowering role that the state has prescribed for women, namely as mother to her children and wife to her husband. All government policies throughout the three decades of the New Order regime was based on this premise, denying women of official recognition to her political and economic roles. Women were also objectified at a massive scale through Soeharto’s ambitious population control campaign under the innocent name of ‘family planning’. Major campaigns into urban slums and rural communities were conducted to enforce contraceptive use by women, without providing the support system to address the more fundamental issue of women’s reproductive health. As for gender equality, although CEDAW was ratified quite immediately, there has been no follow-up national legislation to ensure its application into the real lives of women. While women play a prominent role in the labor force and in the economy overall, there are still inadequate policies to address the various forms of inequalities and vulnerabilities that women face in the workplace and in the broader community.
The recent political transition from the New Order regime has had a substantial and distinct impact on women. Two issues have come to the forefront following this transition, namely empowerment of women’s political voice and the struggle to systemically address violence against women. The former is a direct consequence of the prominence of the democratization agenda of the ‘reformation era’. The latter is linked to an incident of massive violence which instigated Soeharto’s decision to resign, namely the week-long rioting against Chinese communities in Jakarta and several other cities during the month of May 1998. One month after the riots, it was disclosed that Chinese women had been made targets of massive sexual violence in its most brutal forms. Other incidences of sexual violence were then disclosed to the public, particularly those which occurred in the military zones of Aceh, Papua and East Timor. Violence against women quickly captured public attention, and women’s rights activists expanded its meaning to cover not only sexual violence during high-stakes political upheaval or military campaigns, but also the more quiet and often invisible violence that women experience in their homes and in the process of employment.
The Challenge of Religious Extremism to Women
At the early years of the ‘reformation era’, women activists were focused on getting women out to vote in the first democratic election for more than three decades. They were also busy negotiating with both old and new political parties on addressing women’s concerns in the election campaigns. PKB, the party of the traditionalist Muslim’s Nahdahtul Ulama, and PAN, the party of the modernist Muslims Muhammadiyah, were both open to the women’s agendas and received considerable support from women activists. PDI-P, the biggest opposition party at that time, was headed by a woman, Megawati Soekarnoputri, who rose to power in the shadow of her charismatic and much idolized father, Soekarno. On the issue of violence against women, women activists were focused on strengthening their own capacity in providing assistance to women victims of violence, on presenting a legislative bill on domestic violence to the Parliament, and on putting gender-based violence in the human rights agenda of the nation. Within this spectrum of activism, Muslim feminist intellectuals were breaking ground to establish a place for gender justice within the framework of Islam in Indonesia.
Although women’s rights activists were concerned about the violent attacks of jihad forces in the conflict areas like Maluku and through the bombing campaigns around the country, the political agenda of radical Islamist groups did not come directly into the world of women’s rights until calls for the enstatement of the Shariah Law were increasingly made and seriously considered. This occurred less at the level of national politics than at the level of local politics, invigorated by the new opportunities produced by regional autonomy. This, combined with the liberalization of party politics, brought women into the center of religiously-motivated political discourse and mobilization.
The nature of the challenge of religious extremism on the lives of Indonesian women can be understood through its positioning in two areas:
(i) the contesting of the idea of ‘womanhood’ and the related attempts at its codification into institutions of the state, and
(ii) the instrumentality of women in furthering the cause, through both active embracement of the willing as well as violent sanctioning of the female ‘misfits’.
Why does this matter? To situate the centrality of women in the struggles of religious extremists, both as a fundamental expression of their distinctiveness and as an instrumental means to an end.
Radical Islamist groups propose an alternative vision of women’s role in society, one that is considered ‘more Islam’ than the conventional, mainstream roles currently in practice in the mainstream Indonesian society. Associated with this vision is a prescription on the physical appearance of women and an explicit delineation of what kinds of roles and positions are acceptable and what is prohibited for women in public and private life. These views are strongly held and actively voiced, as they are central to demonstrating the distinctiveness of the Islamist worldview. Within the political arena, the radical Islamists, supported by fundamentalist and conservative Muslims, make concerted attempts at changing the normative foundations of the Indonesian nation in order to institutionalize their views. In the current ‘reformation era’, regional autonomy opens up the possibility of codifying the Shariah Law as the legal basis of governance for particular regions. The content of legislative bills currently developed as part of this effort puts heavy, if not to say primary, focus on women’s role in society, the terms of women’s mobility (to be accompanied by her muhrim) and women’s dress.
The centrality of women for radical Islamists is also of a more instrumental nature. Women’s support for these groups are actively sought, through special targetting of women in their recruitment efforts, both within campus grounds as well as in communities. Political parties which espouse Islamist views and aspire to Islamize the Indonesian society not only recruit women, but also mobilize them for public displays of political opposition. The Justice Party, for example, is notorious for its ability to place thousands of women clad in white from head to toe and marching to the call of the party in the main streets of Jakarta. Women’s participation is key, though not enough that they can make their mark on the dominant discourse of their party or community. The instrumental value of women seems confined in their ability to guarantee the continual reproduction and expansion of their community.
The challenge that religious extremism pose to women comes also in a more indirect way. In Indonesia, violent campaigns against brothels and women in the sex industry have accompanied bombing attacks against churches, nightclubs and American companies. The jihad war was never limited only to the conflict areas of Maluku and Poso, for example, but also in small towns around Java directed at women who do not fit their worldview. In addition to the victimization of women in these campaigns, they also perpetuate and strengthen the culture of violence that is currently plaguing the nation. In the meantime, the impact of the culture of violence goes beyond the public political sphere and into the private homes of women and girls.
Gendered Arenas of Struggle
At a time when women activists were raising the stakes to empower women’s political voice and systematically address violence against women in a post-Soeharto era, the radical Islamists – supported by conservative and fundamentalist Muslims – were pulling them back to traditional arenas of debate regarding women’s role in society. These arenas are: the public-private debate, women’s sexuality and the institution of marriage.
On the public-private divide
Given the very political nature of the post-Soeharto ‘reformation era’ where political leadership of the country is ‘up for grabs’, as it were, the issue of women’s leadership became an obvious target for radical Islamists and their supporters. This was especially relevant since the strongest candidate from one of the major political parties, PDI-P, was a woman (Megawati Soekarnoputri). Opposition to her party, which has a variety of reasons , was often framed in religious terms, referring to an interpretation of Islam which says women are prohibited from becoming a leader of the state. The state-sanctioned Majelis Ulama Indonesia, which has been given the authority to formulate fatwa, even gave support to this idea through a fatwa in 1999. Although this did not have any signifcant impact on the final outcome of the elections, since Megawati was eventually elected as Indonesia’s fifth president, it did influence the public discourse on the limits of women’s public role.
In 2003, in the campus of one of the main Islamic universities in Indonesia, a woman became a strong candidate as president of a student organization. She happened to be also a member of Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), a campus-wide organization espousing conservative and Islamist views. As the campaign period progressed, she came under pressure to withdraw on the basis of her gender. Her campaign posters were painted over with a mustache and a Malay cap for Muslim men called the peci. Eventually, after advice from her colleagues in LDK, she officially declined her candidacy. A similar story was experienced by a female member of Majelis Mujahidin, one of the main Islamist groups in the country. She also withdrew her candidacy after her husband consulted with their leader, Abu Bakar Baasyir. He apparently said that men should be at the front of the jihad, and women should be providing support to take the men’s place in the family if the jihad faces political difficulties.
If not as leaders in the public sphere, then where is women’s place? Hisbut Tahrir defines women’s primary role is as mother and educator in the home. They are obliged to obey their husbands and educate their children. Although women can have social roles in public, this is secondary to their role in the family. Hisbut Tahrir does not consider this a narrow ‘domestic’ role for women, but rather as the kind of public role that is specifically women’s to educate the future of the ummah. Majelis Mujahiddin, on the other hand, designates women as mujahidah, or the female fighter, who must be able to take over her husband’s responsibility in the case that he is caught and imprisoned. In this case, women’s role is not determined in terms of a public-private divide, but rather in terms of a secondary, supportive role to men.
The articulation of the private-public divide has also been expressed in terms of enforcement of segregation between men and women in public spaces. In some municipalities where the Shariah Law is being considered in the local parliament, the municipal government has disseminated a proposal to segregate public schools and public swimming pools. Among members of the Hisbut Tahrir, women and men must carry out their activities separately, each with their own physically-segregated quarters.
On women’s sexuality
Fundamentalist and Islamist groups are actively and systematically redefining women’s sexuality and women’s space for relations with the opposite sex. One member of LDK describes the prohibition on dating and the alternative offered to her:
“We avoid dating because this approaches zina. I have only spoken to a male student once and that was because of an emergency situation. In LDK, we have a mechanism for dealing with men who fall in love with a women member of the group. The leader will arrange an introduction between him and the woman, to allow them to get to know each other better, covering both the good and bad sides of the personality. Both are obliged to be honest and there is a moderator to assist in the process. If the introduction is considered OK, and they love each other, then they can immediately continue with marriage.”
Another woman describes her newly-found sense of beauty and with whom she is allowed to share it:
“We define that beauty is not based on physical beauty, but rather inner beauty and health consciousness, such as eating healthy food. We do not use comestics because we cannot dress up (tabarruj) in front of other people except our husbands and muhrim.”
The covering up of the female body is commonly required by the various fundamentalist and Islamist groups, though to different degrees or modes. The Lembaga Dakwah Kampus in the universities requires the covering of women’s upper chest area but still allows women to wear wide pants and light colors which are not transparent. Hisbut Tahrir also allows light colors but the headcover must be wide and covering the chest area, and women must wear long wide dress. Usroh and Islam Jamaah groups allows only black or dark colors for women’s clothing, which would look like a single long robe from top to bottom, and the face is totally covered except for the eyes.
Fundamentalist groups have also formulated a bill on pornography, with the support of the State Ministry of Religion, which has an expansive definition of the term that directly impose upon women’s autonomy regarding her body. This bill is still far away from being discussed in the parliament, however, as there is a long list of other legislation considered as a priority.
While indoctrination and dialogue is the mode of expression regarding views on women’s sexuality for women who have come into their community, violence is the means by which the radical groups reject different expressions of sexuality by women outside their community. Women have been threatened for going out at night without their muhrim. One threat expressed inYogyakarta, and reported in one of the major daily newspapers, said that there will be raids to seek women who are out at night without their muhrim. Initially, the raids will focus on sex workers, but eventually any woman who is without a muhrim will be beaten up. In Aceh, women not wearing headcovers were specifically targetted by young men with scissors who would forceably cut their hair, or pour paint over women not dressed in full cover. As for sex workers, violent raids by radical Islamist groups have been reported in many towns and cities, especially where the public discourse on enstating the Shariah Law in the region have reached a high point. Until today, these acts of violence occur with impunity.
On the institution of marriage
The institution of marriage has received much attention among fundamentalist and Islamist groups. Early marriage, as described above, is strongly encouraged (in order to avoid pre-marital sex, according to one publication). But aside from this, marriage is actively used as a means to build the kind of Muslim community they aspire. In many cases, young men and women who are members of these groups are married without their parents’ consent or involvement, as the marriage is facilitated by the leaders of this community.
Marriage is also used as a means to bring together different branches of Islamist groups, or groups based in different parts of the country or the world (Malaysia and the Middle East). Daughters of Islamist leaders are married off to men who are groomed to lead new off-shoot groups. The International Crisis Group, for example, reports that one of thte criteria for formal membership in the Jemaah Islamiyah is the reliability of the wife. So, if a wife originates from the same community of Islamists, then the chances for a hopeful candidate’s membership increases. The institution of marriage and daughters are, once again, like in olden days of sultans and kingdoms, is being used for the purpose of building political alliances and broadening political support base. Once again, women are denied of her autonomy for political ambitions.
The public debate on women place within Islam is facilitated by a recent upsurge in the printing and media industries. Following the boom in Islamic publications in the 1980s, there were many books translated from the Arab language, including those which had strong gender biases, promoted the domestification of women and accused feminism and gender issues as part of a Western conspiracy to destroy Islam. These books were sold widely and cheaply by street vendors located in busy intersections and other strategic locations, such as near mosques, at bus and train stations and supermarkets. During the ‘reformation era’, there was a particularly significant boom in women’s magazines and journals. They presented divergent views on women’s roles, from the fundamentalist to the feminist. In terms of printing and distribution capacity, however, the former had significantly higher reach than the latter, as shown from this table below.
Women’s Magazines and Journals in Reformation Era
No. Name Perspective Format and Audience Copies Printed
1 UMMI Fundamentalist Islam Popular digest 100,000
2 Noor Popular Islamic, feeding to consumerism Deluxe magazine for women aged 25-35 40,000
3 Alimah Popular, scientific and stylish Islam Semi digest magazine for female teens 15,000
4 Muslimah Popular Islam, feeding into consumerism Magazine for female teens 20,000
5 Rahima Feminist Islam, social science Semi journal magazine 2,000
6 Jurnal Perempuan Feminist Academic journal 3,000
Women’s Agency in the Islamic Discourse on Justice
Indonesian Muslim women have not simply been passive recepients of prescriptions from sources of authority, religious or otherwise. The wearing of headcover, which in Indonesian is commonly referred to as the jilbab, for example, initially spread among young Indonesian women in the 1980s as a symbol of resistance to Soeharto’s authoritarian regime. At that time there was strong repressive measures against student political organizing and particularly against Muslim political organizing. It can be said that there is a dynamic of ‘jilbab politics’ occurring in the society. The wearing of jilbab soon spread among the adult community of women in the middle and upper classes when Soeharto began to court the Muslim community to gain its support in the 1990s. The trend was set by the President’s eldest daughter who, fashionably and politically, put on a jilbab as her father systematically built his support base among Muslim intellectuals. In this process, the fashion industry, where many women designers sought their living, started to produce stylish Islamic dress for middle and upper class women. This was eventually supported by women’s magazines which advertised such clothings in their slick publications. These days, when mainstream women wearing the jilbab explain their choice to do so, there are a wide range of motivations are provided. These include: the simple enhancing of their beauty and keeping up with new fashion styles, making a conscious effort to be well-accepted among religious communities, increasing a sense of safety and security in public places, and a linking to a heigtened sense of spirituality.
The motivation behind women’s participation in various fundamentalist and Islamist groups also does not necessarily reflect simple submission to the will of others. One member of the fundamentalist Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) explains her motivation for joining as an issue of respect to women:
“I feel more comfortable joining LDK because I feel secure and respected there. It is unlike my experience in other organizations that I have joined where I felt harrassed and disrespected. This group, especially the male members, have treated me well and with respect.”
A female member of Hisbut Tahrir who is also a post-graduate student of medicine explains her motivation for participation in terms of gaining a more insightful framework of analysis for big issues of the day:
“I have studied medical science for a long time, but I have only become intelligent after attending the prayer and preaching sessions (pengajian) of Hisbut Tahrir. I had been doing research on the impact of pollution on public health. I was suddenly made aware that I had only been tracing the micro sources of this problem, that in fact the problem is rooted in a global system of capitalism and Western ideology. I realize now that I cannot solve this problem only at a micro level, but must address it from a macro and comprehensive level in order to change the system. Islam is the best system.”
Within their own fundamentalist or Islamist communities, women are posing, albeit quietly, their own challenges to the dominant view. Women in an Islamist pessantren have chosen to violate the prohibition against using contraceptives because they are not willing to be continuously pregnant; female students who are members of Lembaga Dakwah Kampus continue to engage in political activism in their campus because they believe it is good for their own capacity building; and wives are actively negotiating with their Islamist husbands so that they have space to carry out tasks in the home and outside in the community.
Since the mid-1990s, Muslim women activists and intellectuals have been involved in critiquing dominant interpretations of Islam which contain biases against women. Among the most dynamic sources of such initiatives came from the traditionalist Muslim community of Nahdatul Ulama and its network of pesantren. Publications with new interpretations of Islam were produced and regular discussion groups and workshops among pesantren communities were carried out. In the ‘reformation era’ under the presidency of Abdurrachman Wahid, who himself was the spiritual and political leader of Nahdatul Ulama, initiatives were made to develop some pesantren into safe houses for women victims of violence, including domestic violence .
PART 3 – ISLAM AND THE RECLAIMING OF SPACE FOR DEMOCRACY AND JUSTICE IN INDONESIA
Looking more broadly into past and recent history, we find that Islam has provided a dynamic language of protest and resistance to authoritarian states in Indonesia, ever since the colonial times. Discourses on democracy and justice have flourished within the various mainstream Muslim communities, among the traditionalists as well as the modernists, including during the height of Soeharto’s power. Indeed, many of the first generation NGOs in Indonesia came from Islamic institutions and backgrounds. They challenged authoritarianism and structural injustices both through Islam-based as well as the more secular social science-based discourses (e.g., LP3ES). Broadly speaking, Islam-based discourse has always been an integral part of social movements in Indonesian history and it is no different in this current period of post-Soeharto political transition.
Sources of Resistance to Religious Extremism
There is a wave of resistance building up to limit the spread and impact of religious extremism among the general population in Indonesia. This wave orginates from different centers of organizing, each with their distinct strengths and weaknesses: progressive Muslim intellectuals, interfaith coalitions, the women’s movement as well as, to some degree, party politics.
Indonesian progressive Muslim intellectuals have been rigorously engaged in developing an Islamic discourse on democracy and justice which fits Indonesian realities. Both NGO-based and university-based study groups, workshops, research, conferences and publications which grapple with these issues have become common since the latter years of Soeharto’s regime. When the post-Soeharto religious extremism rose to public view, these intellectuals formed groups specifically oriented to present alternative paradigms. Their varying names indicated the flourishing and vigor of this effort: ‘liberal Islam’ (based in the universities), ‘post-traditional Islam’ (based in the pesantren community), ‘emancipatory Islam’ (based in the pesantren community), ‘indigenous Islam’ (cultural analysis) and ‘transformative Islam’ (based in NGOs). Campus-based student organizations also participated in these diverse discourses.
In direct response to the inter-religious conflicts occurring in many parts of the country as well as to the increasing incidents of bomb attacks against churches, most of which happened during the ‘reformation era’, interfaith coalitions began to mushroom. These inter-faith coalitions involved groups and individuals from diverse backgrounds, such as religious leaders, academics, NGO leaders, women’s rights activists, human rights advocates, government officials, and people from the professional and business world. Some coalitions were set up in an ad hoc manner, ‘on-the-spot’ as violent incidents happened, others were established with a long-term agenda of institution building.
The women’s movement also initiated many interfaith agendas. Women from both the Muslim and Christian communities in Maluku, where inter-religious conflicts had been going on for years, defied their male fellows to established constant, albeit underground, contact with each other. The women from both communities felt they were equally victims of this conflict. These interfaith alliances have links to the national level, where similar coalitions were established and could exist with less direct threat than in the conflict zones. In the meantime, women’s rights activists, theologians and religious intellectuals were coming together to talk about and address the issue of religious extremism in their respective religions as their common problem, rather than as the problem of one particular religion only.
Among the political parties, PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) which is the party of the traditionalist Muslims, proactively presents a pluralist, secular and multicultural political platform, under the leadership of Abdurrachman Wahid. However, this platform is stronger at the level of national politics than at the local level, where many Nahdatul Ulama members have shown more openness to conservative viewpoints. Some have described this as a ‘structural vs cultural divide’ within the organization – the ‘structural’ being the formal party line and the ‘cultural’ being the tendency of its members.
All the above forces have immersed themselves in the resistance against religious extremism not simply for the sake of mending inter-religious relations, but also as part of their broader struggles to create a more democratic and just nation-state. In this context, it is critical for these respective groups/centers of organizing to move the discourse forward to specifics: religious perspectives and foundations for democratic decision making, social justice and human rights; developing broadbased consensus regarding the space and mechanism for cultural and religious pluralism and co-existence; redefining the role of state and of the military to match the vision of a democratic and just nation.
Strategies for Reclaiming Space for Democracy and JusticeThe combination of a rise in religious conservatism and extremism, on the one hand, and a nation struggling to democratize itself after an historic political transition, on the other hand, have generated a multitude of initiatives from different bases of organizing. At stake is the kind of ‘new’ Indonesia which would be created for the next generation. The strategies which have been used to address these challenges can be roughly categorized in the following way:
1. Developing new religious interpretations and new bodies of knowledge as the foundation for building democracy, pluralism and social justice
More tolerant, non-violent and gender-sensitive interpretations of religious texts are being promoted in various institutions, such as in enlightened pesantrens, religious-based universities (such as UIN Jakarta and IAIN Yogya) and NGOs. Theologians, religious leaders and young progressive intellectuals are expressing and publishing their alternative interpretations.
A burst of empirical research in areas where religious extremism is prevalent and analyses of fundamentalist and extremist views and organizations is being conducted in universities, research centers and NGOs. They are focused on increasing understanding on the phenomenon, its underlying forces and root causes.
2. Implementing systematic programs on public education and media
Education programs for communities on pluralism and progressive interpretations of religion are being carried out by NGOs working at the grassroots level. Television and radio talkshows challenging extremist and fundamentalist views are being hosted by young progressive intellectuals. Moderate religious leaders are increasingly more responsive in making public statements denouncing hostile attacks against different religions. One radio program was ended midway by the radio station because its generated too many threats from militant groups, but other programs continue to stay on air and the host of this program will try again. One liberal Muslim intellectual who spoke strongly on the importance of religious tolerance and contextual-reading of the Koran received death threats, though it did not stop him from speaking out.
3. Building broadbased and inter-religious strategic coalitions and alliances
Broadbased coalitions and alliances are being established for a variety of purposes and in diverse settings:
inter-religious alliances
New organizations, networks and coalitions have been established by individuals and institutions from different religions to create inter-religious communities working together. Issues being dealt with in this way include peace building and reconstruction, migrant workers’ rights, identity-based politics, and the value of tolerance per se.
interlinking between religious intellectuals and the anti VAW movement
Women’s organizations addressing violence against women (VAW) are building alliances with religious leaders, thinkers and institutions to find new interpretations of religious text which can be juxtaposed to interpretations which contribute to the perpetuation of VAW. As more and more religious women’s groups are providing support for women victims of violence, they become advocates of more progressive interpretations of their religions. This means women from religious as well as activist (secular) backgrounds are joining together in the fight against VAW, including in developing and bringing support for the legislation on domestic violence currently under discussion in the national parliament. Religious scholars are making presentations in the parliament in support of this legislation, providing reasoning from religious texts and interpretations.
across-the-board support for key individuals, local initiatives and strategic institutions
Organizations are working together as networks comprised of different types of institutions, such as NGOs, pesantren, universities, groups within religious women’s organizations, government agencies and national commissions, to ensure that mutual support is available when needed and is sustainable. Individuals and institutions disseminating more progressive religious interpretations have high mobility across different levels and sectors within this network.
4. Opening dialogue with members of fundamentalist and extremist groups
Although still at a preliminary stage, efforts have been designed and initiated to establish dialogue between women from fundamentalist and progressive organizations. Muslim feminists have started contacting and interviewing women who are members of fundamentalist and Islamist groups, including those in closed pesantren settings. UMMI, a women’s magazine promoting conservative and fundamentalist views, have invited women from progressive backgrounds to participate in discussions and events with them.
5. Exploring cross-regional alliances beyond national borders for problem solving
Women’s groups in Indonesia and human rights groups from several Arab countries have made a commitment to collaborate together for the protection of Indonesian migrant workers employed in the Arab region. Aside from advocating on specific cases of abuse, this collaboration is also designed to develop a more conceptual base for the struggle which would come from a framework of human rights within Islam. For this purpose, the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) has established a new network of organizations focussing particularly on the human rights of migrants, namely the Arab Migrant Center.
Limitations and Challenges
Despite the wealth of initiatives from Indonesian civil society groups to deal with religious extremism and promote the transformation towards democracy and social justice, the challenges remain huge and disconcerting. The broader structural condition of the Indonesia polity is, unfortunately, very problematic. Despite five years into the ‘reformation era’, the cycle of violence and impunity has not been broken. The rule of law has not been able to rise over the politics of power, nepotism and corruption which has prevailed in Indonesia’s legal and judicial institutions for decades. Weak and uninsightful leadership in the current government has prolonged the negative impacts of the economic crisis for the average population, not to mention the desperate poor. In the meantime, the government’s enthusiastic embrace of the ‘war against terrorism’ has brought about new legislation which would legitimize (yet again) authoritarian powers of the state and the military for the sake of security. If the fundmentals necessary for economic survival and a sense of human dignity continues to be lacking for the average population, all good and ambitious efforts to rebuild trust among and within communities will have a very fragile foundation for success.
In addition to the external variables, there are also internal limitations which exist among the multitude waves of progressive initiatives. A frank discussion among progressive activists and young Muslim intellectuals came up with this list of internal weaknesses in the movement :
there are some ‘blind spots’ in the organizing initiatives which have not covered crucial arenas where religious extremism is spreading: public schools, mosques, prayer groups (majelis taklim) and television shows;
activities in pesantren communities have been mostly focused on its leadership and elites – elite-centrist – and too little engagement is invested on its members at the grassroots level;
Muslim feminists have not done enough ciritical reflection on its own strategies to address religious extremism among women;
there are fragmentations within the movement itself which need to be overcome.
Despite the rigour of the current progressive movement and the long history of a tolerant Islam in Indonesia, there is no guarantees that democracy, multiculturalism and social justice will prevail within Indonesia’s immediate future. So many serious external and internal challenges and limitations exist. Indonesians will not be able to do it alone. Linking beyond its national borders with like-minded individuals, institutions and movements has become a critical and non-negotiable imperative.
The meeting Organized by
Sisters In Islam, Malaysia
Building Bridges between Southeast Asia and the Middle East
The Rockefeller Center, Bellagio Italy
30 September – 2 October 2003
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